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Probably no other questions within t e last three decades
have involved the 5.)pretneCort of the United States in more
ierplexinr disciussions than those req:iring the construction
of various clauses in the Federal aonstitution, as applied
to the laws rroverninf. corporations.
A constantly increasing tendency toward centralization
and consolidation has made the old methods of doing b';siness
on a larre scale expensive and impracticable, while, at the
same time, it has become apparent that under corporate form,
enormous industrial interests can be controlled and managed
with wonderful facility. As a natural result, the number of
corporations has increased at an almost incredible rate and to
suCh an extent that now, they control -the bulk of the business
of this country. This change in our industrial methods has
necessitated a great deal of legislation, and we find the
state law-making bodies constantly engaged in revising, re-
pealing and enacting laws for the government of corporations.
It is a well-known fact that legislation makes litigation,
and this fact has never been be4tter exemplified than in the
instance we are fow considering. While our legislatures have
been continually przzled and harassed in the attempt to make
perfect laws to regulate these enterprising legfal entities,
our courts have been no less perplexed and bewildered in their
C)
effort to apply old rules and principles to entirely new
situations and circumstances. The Pederal Slipreme Court
S Qrns to be tle goal for which this class f litipants are ever
striving; The magnitude of the interests concerned impells
the interested parties to continie their legal strife until
the decision of that last tribunal has been obtained, and the
volumes of the United States reports show a constantly increas-
ing number of cases brought~by laws applicable to corl.orations.
In many of the questions thus presented for discussion,
the constitutionality of some state statute has been the primal
consideration, and this has necessitated a cf;nstructi..n of
some clase of the 'ederal constitution in almost every in-
stance. The case of Maine vs. The Crand Trunk Railway is of
this kind, its decision resting fundamentally on the con-
struLction placed upon the third clause of 2ection F, Article
III of the Federal Constitution, which provides that:---
"Congress shall have power to reFulhte commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."
The case arose under a laine statute providing that every
corporation, person or association, operating a railroad in
the state s'ovld pay to he state treas~'rer for the use of the
state, an annual excise tax for the privilege of exercising
its franchise in the state, to be determined by the amnount of
its gross transportation receipts; and in the case of a
road lying partly within and partly without the state, by the
same proportion of the gross receipts as the mileage of the
road in the state bears to its gross mileage. The Grand Trunk
Railwa-, Company refused to pay this tax, claiming that it was
a violation of the provision of the Federal Constitution cited
above, and the state of Maine bro~ight snit to enforce its
collection.
IMAr. Justice Field, who wrote the opinion of !.he prevailing
side of the court, maintained that the tax was not an infringe-
,,lent upon the clawIse of the constitution above referred to,
since it was not a tax upon commerce bizt an excise tax, specif-
ically stated to be -nch in the statute, cand imposed ipon the
1rivileve of exercising the franchise of the company in the
state of Malne. Te said further:--
"The privilege of exercising the franchises of a cor-
poration within a state is generally one of value, and often
of graat value, r:nd the subject of earnest contention. It is
natural, therefore, that the corporation should be made to
bear --ome proportion of the burdens of poverwnent. As the
granting of the privilege rests entirely in the discretion of
the sitate, whether the corpora..ion be of foreign or domestic
origin, it may be conferr'ed upon stuch conditions, pecuniary
or otherwise, as the state in its judgment may deem most con-
ducive to its interests or policy. It may require the payment
into its treasury, each year, of a specific sum, or may appor-
tion the amount exacted according to the value of the business
permitted, as disclosed by its gains or receipts of the present
or past years. The character of the tax, or its validity,
is not determined by the mode adopted in fixing its amount for
any specific period or the times of its payment. The whole
4field of inquiry into the extant of revenue from sources at the
command of the corporation is open to the consideration of the
State in determining what may be Justly exacted for the priv-
ilege. The rule of apportioning the charge to the receipts
of the business would seem to be eminently reasonable, and like-
ly to produce the most satisfactory results, both to the State
and the corporation taxed."
Probably no decision of the Federal Supreme Court has been
more vigorously attacked than the one, a portion of which we
have Just cited. We have seen many expressions of opinion in
rerard to it, and they are nearly unanimouas in their disappro-p
bation of the ideas advanced. A number of other cases have
divided the Supreme Court five to four as did this case, but
in other instances, the prevailing opinion has been generally
approved, while in Maine vs. Grand Trunk Railway, the argu-
ments used in the dissenting opinion seem to have succeeded in
raining more adherents from the community at large.
Before considering the able dirtsentinp opinion of Mr.
Justice Bradley, with whom concurred Justices Harlan, Lamar and
Brown, let I examine a little more carefully into the ease
before us and consider first the attitude of the legislature
toward railroad corporations in F oneral, with., a view to aa-
certaining the reasons existing for the azssement of the tax
in question.
As is so well stated by Mr.J :stice Field, in the language
already quoted, the privilege of exercising the franchises of a
5corporation is generally one of -reat value. This is partic-
ularly true of a corporation, q7iasi-public in its nature, like
a rZ ilroad, possessing many valu0able attributes which are not
conferred-pon private corpofate bodies. The right given
to a body of individuals to control and operate for f-ain a
portion of fhe -neral highway system of the state, and to ex-
erci:e in s, ch operation the sovereign pow-)er of eminent domain,
is a privilege which cert&inly merits ,-ome return from the
recipients.
The only way in which the state can receive compensation
for the great benefits thus conferred is through the medium of
taxation. And here arises a most serious problem. What
method of taxation will at the sait time secure +he beat re-
tv.rns to th. state and prove most equable to the corporation
There are four principal methods in vogue for the taxation
of corporation, which are us follows:--e
First:-- Upon the corporate franchise.
Second:- Upon the corporate property.
Third:-- Upon the capital stock.
Four ,,h:-- Upon the business (one or profits accruing.
The riethod which first prevailed in the United States was
the taxation or corporations ulpon L}eir re~al and personal prop-
erty, and this method is still adheri;d to by many of them. But
this system of taxation h~s never attained the success expected
for several reasons. The expense attached to the assessment
6and collection of such a tax makes its returns comparattvel
small, zLfnd in proportion is the net returns to .- the state
over the cost of the levy are treater or smaller, so the burden
upon the corporation becomes less or Freater. The state ex-
pects a certain proportionate amount of revenue from the taxa-
tion of coroporations. If this amo-nt falls short, the rate
of taxation upon the corporations must be correspondingly in-
creased.
The difficulty of accurately appraising the right of way
and rolling stock of a railroad is another strong objection to
this manner of taxation. The brildings, fixtures and real
vroperty are easily accessible, have a definite situs, and can
be rc adily appraised* Elt there is a lare amount of railroad
property, mdvable in its nature, which it is extremely hard to
locate in any one place, and mlch of this escapes taxation.
The taxation of capital stock, on the other hand, meets
with much complaint of injlistice to holders. Capital stock
if taken as a basis for the taxation of a corpcration is first
t-xed as a whole and as The property of the colpporation. But
the shares, being private personal prop'erty in the hands of in-
dividmttls, ace also subject to assessment as such private prop-
erty, and this brings about a system of double taxat'ion that
entails an ac'ual hardship upon the stockholders. In some
siates shares of stock are exempt by statute when the corpora-
tion itself is taxed upon the capital stock. But the state,
havinr Jurisdiction of the person) may t x a shareholder upon
7shares held by him in a foreign corporation whose property is
beyond its J1,risdiction, the residence of the owner being con-
sidered the situs of the stock. It will th s be seen that
it is ro 4imple matter to frame a statute which answers all the
manifold requirements above indicated.
Now the Maine statute under consideration proposes a dif-
ferent method. iet -s examine it more fully in the light of
these diffioulties surrom ding any proposed pln of taxation.
Section I provides:-- "The buildings of every railroad corpor-
ation or association, whether within or without the located
right of way, and its lands and fixtures outside of its loeated
riFht of way, shall be subject to taxation by the several
cities and towns in which such buildings, land and fixtures
may be situated, as other property is taxed therein."
This is a perfectly simple and Justifiable assessment upon
the real and personal property of the corporation which has an
actual location and can be easily and specdily ascertained and
collected by each municipality.
8ection I1 provides:-- "Every corporation, person or asso-
ciati n, operating any railroad in this state, shall pay to the
state treasuorer for the use of the state, an annual excise
tax, for the privilege of exercising its franchises in this
stats, which with the tax provided for in section one (supra)
shall be in lieu of all taxes upon such railroad, its property
nd stock. There shall be apportioned and paid by the state
from the taxes received under the pr4visions of this act, to the
several cities and towns in which, on the first day of April in
each year, is held railrold stock here exempted fromother
taxation, an amount equal to one per centum of the val Xc of
such stock on that day, as delermined by the governor and the
council; provided, however, that the total amount thus appor-
tioned on account of any railroad shall not exceed the sum re-
ceived by the state as tax on account of such railroad."
These two sections comprise the whole theory of the stat-
. ..he remainder of the statute merely contains the pro-
visions for the manner in which the tax shall be assessed,
which is, as we have stated, by a reference .to the gross trans-
portation receipts, that are to be divided by the number of mile,
of railroad operated to asoertain the averare gross receipts
per mile, and then the tax is assessed upon the gross trans-
portation receipts in an increasing ratio as the average gross
receipts per mile increase. When a road lies partly within
and partly without the state, the tax shall be equal to the
same proportion of the gross receipts in this state, to be
ascertained by dividing the total gross receipts by the whole
number of miles operated and multiplying by the number of miles
;ithin the state.
We are led to consider this scheme most just and equitable
to all conc mred. The road is relieved of all taxation save
that provided for in the sections above cited, and that can be
easily and accurately assessed ano collected. There is a
pecial exemption of the stock from taxation, so that the op-
9pressive double taxation feut'ire is dore away with.
While it is true that the gross emaoiint of business which is
boin transacted by a corporation is not always an accurate
incication of the v-jve of Its property and franchises, we
cun think of no other manner of estimating its worth %%ihich is
lik}ely to be more r~liable. Certainly the capital stock, with
its constant fluct:ation iinder The hands of al 3tr-et . opera-
tors is not; nor could the net receipts be safely taken as a
basis for taxation, since cross mismanagement and fraudulent
Giversion of profits into ostensible betterments and improve-
ments, mif-ht easily leave the corporation with no net receipts
whatever.
We have been led to consider the apparent fairness of this
scheme of taxation at some length, rom ,he fact that in all
comments on this case which have come to our notice, the statute
itself, ar; a whole, has received little ov no attention, it
having been apparently assumed on all sides th; t i tsole purpose
was extortion and oppression. Even the learned justice whQ
wrote the di isenting opinion strongly implies this idea. t
has possibly, escaped the notice or some of the able commenta-
tors upon this decision that this statute was not framed with
the solo purpose of' collecting a smnall tax from the Gr .nd Trunk
Rhilway Company, bt to relate the whole policy of the state
of aine in its tax dealings itth te arot whin its bor-
ders, and a decision declar-ing this statute to be unconstitu-
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tional would be of v'tal consequence to '.he state.
We have puro3(.ly avoided ip to this time the opposing
arguments so ably s.ef forth in the dissontinCg opinion of Ir.
,TStice Dridley, wishing to well eslablish first the foneral
roas)onzbleness rid equity of the statute in question. Even
our opponents must admit that as applied to railroads wholly
within the state, no 'possible objection c-n be made to it. But
when it is sought to apply this system of taxation to a road
lying partly within and partly without the boudnries of
the state, the attorreys for the r, nd Trunk Railway, raise
their voices in an outbreak of patriotic enthusiasm and declare
that we are endangering the commerce of the country and over-
turning the constitution of the United Sl,ates.
This n ntion while apparently upheld by the weight of
athority, is, nevertheless "& believe, unsound. It was
manifestly not the purpose of the legislature of Maine to lay afLj
restriction upon inter-state commerce or to in any way endeavor
to control or regulate it. Vere was a rLtllroad transacting
considerable business in their state and recciving many benefits
and rivilees. T.y.- should it not pay its share of the bur-
dons of the state? To allow it to co entirely free from tax-
ation would be to to discriminate against the road wholly within
its bounda.ries in favor of a foreign corporation. The state
did not attempt to tax the business of this railroad, but simply
to require some ret~rM for the privileg~e of exercising its cor-
porate franchise within its borders. And in order to arrive
at the vlue of that frnclise it proposed the sc,,ome above set
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forth;- that of sing the gross reccipts .s an indication of
the probable value of the entire fr nchise , and a' proportion
t ,er of equivalaRt to the proportionate Maine mileage of the
ro:d as a fair basis for estimating; the value of the franchise
in that state. v'e fail to see that the operation of this stat-
ute could interfere with inter-state cominerce in the slightest
degree.
The fundamental question at the bottom of this whole inter-
state connerce discussion is really as to what constitutes a
",re ulation" of commerce between the states within the meaning
Jf the constitution. And it is right hero, in our opinion, t ay
the Courts have b:on led astray in their zeal to carry out the
intention of the framers of that instriment. Although the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the large number of cases on
this subject which have come before it, have been based on wide-
ly varied reasons, yet the ttimate design in each instance has
been to adhere as strictly as possible to the ideas which were
preseint in the minds of the men who placed this much-discussed
clause in the constitution.
It is somewhat singular that in all the exhaustive and pro-
found arguments which have been advanced on both sides of this
controversy, little or no reference has been made to the pe-
culiar condition of affairs existing In the Colonies at the
time of the adoption of the constitution. The thirteen origi-
nal colonies were practically independent political communitie#
owing an allegiance to Great Britain; but w:ith respect to
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internal matters amonp themselves, each colony was sovereign
and independent. This was particularly true as to commerce
both foreign and domestic, s there was no peneral authority
which regulated their intercourse with each other. As a con-w
sequence those colonies situated tore favorably from a geograph-
ical standpoint, embraced the opportunity to impose taxes upon
the commerce of the other colonies which had to pass through
their ports. This was puromptly resented, and retaliatory
measures were adopted by the colonies thus taxed, and a general
feeling of irritation and unjust discrimination grew up, until
as was said at the time,- "New Jersey, placed between Philadel-
phia and New York was likened to a cask tapped at both ends;
and North Carolina between Virginia and South Carolina, to a
patient bleeding at both arms."
The attempt to correct this evil state of affairs made by
tVe confereration was entirely /As Ocessful owing to the want of
power of that body to enforce its authority, and the most
thorc-,1ugh dissatisfaction every-here prevailed. Schwas the
state of affairs when the constitution was framed and the clause
giving Congress power to regulate commerce mong thestates
was the result. It is apparent that such a proviso was
absolutely essential at the time to the harmony oot the country
at large; and the wisdom of its adoption has been abundantly
demonstrated by the outcome.
But we must look closely at the clause referred to that
its meaning may be clear. What does "regulate" mean as used
13
in this connection? Th, evident intention of the originators
of this idea was to restrict the S4 ates from enacting laws
which might or could actively operate to interfere with the
free interchange of comodities between the states. But we
cannot believe that it was ever intended to prevent the states
from any legislation which might indirectly and remotely op-
erate to ffect inter-state commerce. Such a contention
wou id surely be absurd cince, if carried to a logical conclu-
sion, it would clearly establish that any provision of the
state which had anything whatever to do with inter-state com-
merce, or the business transacted between the stat6s, was, in
somne de rree a "repulation" and therefore unconstitu-tional.
The languwte of .?r.Thstice Strong Ikm± in the case of
$?State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts", 15 Wal.293, seems to
express most forcibly and cogently the common sense view of
this matter. e says:-
"1'io doubt every tax upon personal property or upon occu-
pations, business or franchises, affects more or less the sub-
jects and the operations of commerce. Yet it is not everything
that %.ffects commaerce that amounts to a regulation of it within
the meaning of the constitution."
And again in disc' ssing the tax in quzestion in that case,
wkich was a tax directly on the gross receipts of the railroad
including that portion received for the transportation of
freight to and from points without the state, he says:--
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"Is this tax then, a tax upon freight transported into,
or o-it of, the state, or upon the owner of the freight for the
right of thus transporting it? Certainly it is not directly.
Very manifestly it is a tax upon the railroad company measured
in t-jnou t by the extent of its business or the degree to which
its franchise is exorcised. That its ultimate effect may be
to increase the co;t of transportation, must be admitted. So
it must be Ztt.mitted that I. tax upon any article of personal prop
erty that may become a subject of cowmerce, or ur on any instru-
mnt mf commerce, affects co merce itself. If the tax be upon
the instrmient, such as a stage-coach, a r-iroad car, or a can&
or steamboat, its tendency is to increase the cost of transpor-
tation. Still it is not a tax upon transportation or upon
commerce and it has never been seriously doubted tiat such a
tax may be laid. A tax upon landlords as such, affects rents
and generally increases them, but it would be a misnomer to call
it a tax upon tenants. A tax upon the occupatib.n of a phy-
sician or attcrney measured by the income of his profes:1Aon, or
upon a banker gra<;uated according to the amounts of his dis-
counts or deposits, will hardly be claimed to be a tax on his
patients, clients or customers, though the burden ultimately
11falls upon them.
This reasoning sounds to us like the plaines kind of
common sense, and we have not seen it effoctviely controverted
in any opposings argu ment. It is after all thorn, i question of
fact which we have before us when we undertake the consideration
15
of a statute like the one which occaioned this discussion.
Does t:e statute in qiiestion so operate as to amo-nt in fact
to a regulation of commerce between the states? That is, do
its provisions impose such a burden upon that commerce as will
res-'lt in actual burden to the comnrriore itself or to the shipper
or receiver, because of the trirsportatirn of such cornmerce?
ITf they do, then any such statute is beyond the p rer of a state
to enact and falls ithin the excluisive Jurisdiction of Con-
gross. If they do not, then such a Statute is entirely Justi-
fLiable and the states alone have power to act.
To attempt to reconcile the decisions on this subJect
woild be absolutely useless for they c.nnot be reconciled. Nor
would it be any more possible to deduce or formulate from them
any abstract propositions of law with respect to inter-state
commerce, which may be s9iAd to be clearly established or perma*-
nently settled.
Lir. Justice Field, who wrote the opinion in the Vaine
case, was one of the three Jstices ',ho dissented to the opin-
ion of Mylr. Justice Strong in the case of "State Tax on Railway
Gross Receipts" quoted supra, while the whole court were
uranimous in holding as uinconstitutional and void a Pennsylvan&
statute upon the rros3 r: ceipt$ of a stemmship company incorpor-
ated under the laws of that state, becau;se such receipts were
largely derived from inter-state comtmerce. (Phila. S.S. Co.
vs. Penn., 122 U.S.,326.)
An: number of parallel instances might be cited to show
how the members of the highest Judicial body in our land have
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appeared first on one side of this controversy# F rom the case
of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I, to the '.Maine case under dis-
curssion, the Supreme Court has been constantly bes@t withlthe
Consider'ation of the inter-state commwerce question, presented
to them in an infinite variety of ways and from every possible
point of view.
Lb4r.Justioe Bradley has bcen conspicuous as the unyielding
advocate of the policy of absolutte non-intervertion by the
states, even in the remotest and most indirect marhner with
ar-thing that m. y pos-ibly affect inter-state coLerce. In
earlier times, no doubt the majority of the court believe#7ithearlieritic
him in this uncompromising severity of restriction. :.r.Jstice
Field was, at one time, decidedly of this opinion. Bit we are
inclined to believe tlhat in this decision of Tlaine vs. Grand
Trunk R ilway, there is indicated a decided inclination of the
Supreme Court to refuse to carryf this policy of absolute un-
reasoning restriction any farther. And we believe that the
only possible solution in future cases will be to apply the
test already :entioned, which car:not fail to five adequate
reasons for the sanction or disapproval of a statute which
seems to intergere i;ith the inter-state commerce clause of
the constitution.
To continue on the course advocatld byr :r.Justice P radley
would be fhlly to exempt fvvm all liLbility for the support ;df
thle diffterent states an enormous amount of capital which is
receiving daily the greatest benefits from those states. That
17
sch a consummation is devoutly to be dreaded, no sane man can
deny. And we are profoi ndly grateful to see the first
StImnblinro-block thrown in the path toward absolute immunity of
s:ch franchises from taxation by the clear and lo-ical opinion
of -r.Jstice Fild in the case of MCine vs. Urrnd C'ri7nk Rail-
June, 1894.

